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Abstract Semantic knowledge about objects entails both
knowing how to grasp an object (grip-related knowledge)
and what to do with an object (goal-related knowledge).
Considerable evidence suggests a hierarchical organization
in which speciWc hand-grips in action execution are most
often selected to accomplish a remote action goal. The
present study aimed to investigate whether a comparable
hierarchical organization of semantic knowledge applies to
the recognition of other’s object-directed actions as well.
Correctness of either the Grip (hand grip applied to the
object) or the Goal (end-location at which an object was
directed) were manipulated independently in two experi-
ments. In Experiment 1, subjects were required to attend
selectively to either the correctness of the grip or the goal of
the observed action. Subjects were faster when attending to
the goal of the action and a strong interference of goal-vio-
lations was observed when subjects attended to the grip of
the action. Importantly, observation of irrelevant goal- or
grip-related violations interfered with making decisions
about the correctness of the relevant dimension only when
the relevant dimension was correct. In contrast, in Experi-
ment 2, when subjects attended to an action-irrelevant stim-
ulus dimension (i.e. orientation of the object), no
interference of goal- or grip-related violations was found,
ruling out the possibility that interference-eVects result
from perceptual diVerences between stimuli. These Wndings
suggest that understanding the correctness of an action
selectively recruits specialized, but interacting networks,
processing the correctness of goal- and grip-speciWc infor-
mation during action observation.
Keywords Action semantics · Goals · Grips · 
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Introduction
An important skill underlying our daily interaction with peo-
ple involves understanding other’s actions. When a speaker
at a conference grasps a microphone, you automatically
infer that he wants to start his talk. However, you would be
quite surprised if the speaker moved the microphone to his
ear instead of to his mouth. As the example illustrates, we
use semantic knowledge about objects and their associated
goals to understand other’s intentions. Semantic knowledge
about objects can be described both in terms of knowing
how to use an object (i.e. knowledge about the appropriate
grip for interaction with the object) and knowing what to do
with an (i.e. knowledge about the typical goal-location of
the object; Van Elk et al. 2007). Throughout this paper,
“grip-related aspects of object use” refers to the hand pos-
ture by which an object is grasped, while “goal-related
aspects of object use” refers to the spatial end location to
which actions with objects are typically directed.
Considerable evidence shows that both aspects (grip-
related and goal-related aspects of our knowledge about
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objects) are mediated by diVerent brain areas. Ideational
apraxic patients have diYculty with retrieval of semantic
information about objects (i.e. providing a description of
the object’s use) but they are still able to grasp objects in a
correct fashion. In contrast, ideomotor apraxic patients are
characterized by preserved semantic knowledge about
objects but show a failure to select correct grasping actions
for many objects (Ochipa et al. 1989; Buxbaum 2001). In
line with these Wndings, recent studies suggest that distinct
brain areas are involved the preparation and execution of
grip-related and goal-related aspects of object use (Maj-
dandzic et al. 2007; van Schie and Bekkering 2007). When
subjects prepared an action on the basis of a pre-cued grip
(at which part to grasp an object), enhanced activation was
found in the parieto-occipital sulcus, supporting visuo-
motor transformations for grasping the object. In contrast,
planning an action on the basis of its Wnal goal location
(end position for transportation) resulted in activation in
pre-frontal brain areas, supporting the planning of move-
ments towards more distant behavioral goals. Together,
both neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies suggest
that frontal brain areas contribute to guiding actions
towards Wnal goals, whereas parietal areas are more closely
involved in grip-related aspects of object manipulation.
Recent studies from our lab suggest that action goals
also play an important role at a semantic level. For exam-
ple, preparing an action with an object (e.g. bringing a cup
towards the mouth) was found to facilitate the processing of
words, corresponding to the goal of the prepared movement
(Lindemann et al. 2006). In a follow up ERP study, the
semantic nature of the eVect was conWrmed, by showing an
N400-priming eVect for object-congruent compared to
object-incongruent words (Van Elk et al. 2008). The prim-
ing eVect was only found when subjects prepared a mean-
ingful action with an object (e.g. bringing a cup towards the
mouth), but not when subjects prepared a meaningless
action with the object (e.g. bringing a cup towards the eye).
These Wndings suggest that the preparation of meaningful
actions relies on the activation of goal-relevant semantic
knowledge. Finally, in a recent study it was found that sub-
jects are faster when making a semantic categorization
response towards an object, when the direction of respond-
ing corresponds to the typical goal location of the object
(e.g. faster movements towards the body when observing a
cup, but faster movements away from the body when
observing a hammer; Van Elk et al., submitted). Together,
these studies suggest that the planning and execution of
object directed actions is organized primarily around spe-
ciWc goal locations associated with the object.
However, to bring an object towards its goal location,
the appropriate handgrip has to be selected as well. Rosen-
baum was among the Wrst to note that speciWc hand grips
are selected to accomplish a more remote action goal
(Rosenbaum et al. 1992). For example, when subjects pre-
pare a grasping movement, they typically select a hand grip
that allows them to end the movement in a comfortable
position, which is known as the end-state comfort eVect.
This Wnding directly supports the notion of a hierarchically
organized motor system, in which action goals guide the
selection of lower level action features (i.e. hand grip used
for grasping).
Still, relatively little is known about the functional orga-
nization of the semantic knowledge that enables us to
understand behavior of others. Both goal- and grip-related
aspects need to be processed in order make sense of the
other person’s behavior as well as to understand the (in)cor-
rectness of an observed action. If you observe a person
grasping a cup at the handle, for instance, you would proba-
bly infer that he is grasping to drink, whereas if the person
would grasp the cup at the upper part he would probably
grasp the cup to put it away. An intriguing question is
whether a comparable hierarchical organization of semantic
knowledge, as observed in the planning and execution of
object directed actions, applies to the observation of actions
as well.
Considerable evidence suggests that similar brain areas
are recruited during both the execution and the observation
of actions (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). For example, in
nonhuman primates neurons in premotor cortex respond
both when the monkey performs an object directed action
itself and when the animal observes the experimenter per-
forming the same action (Rizzolatti et al. 1996). This so-
called mirror neuron system supposedly plays an important
role in the recognition and understanding of observed
behavior. Interestingly, the majority of mirror neurons
appears to be sensitive to the overall goal of an observed
action (broadly congruent mirror neurons), irrespective of
the kind of grip used or whether the Wnal action outcome
can be perceived (Gallese et al. 1996; Umilta et al. 2001;
Ferrari et al. 2005). Thereby, mirror neurons probably sup-
port a goal directed interpretation of observed actions.
However, to process the goal of an action, the grip applied
to an object needs to be taken into account as well, as it can
provide valuable information about the actor’s intention
(e.g. grasping to eat or grasping to throw).
The present study aimed at identifying the relation
between goal- and grip-related aspects of object use in
action observation. To this end, we used an action
observation setting in which subjects attended either to
the correctness of the goal location (“is the object held at
the correct goal location?”) or to the correctness of the
grip (“is the object grasped with an appropriate grip?”)
applied to an object. In a previous experiment it was
found that observation of goal-violations (e.g. observing a
cup near the ear) resulted in a stronger interference with
semantic categorization responses than observation ofExp Brain Res (2008) 189:99–107 101
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grip-violations (e.g. observation of a cup with an odd hand
grip; Van Elk et al., submitted). The present study corrobo-
rated on these Wndings to investigate whether the hierarchi-
cal relation between goals and grips in action execution,
applies to judging the correctness of observed actions as
well.
SpeciWcally, we aim to investigate diVerences in speed
and accuracy of judging the correctness of action goals and
grips. Moreover, we seek to Wnd out if these judgments are
performed independent of each other or directly interact.
Given the dominant role of action goals in our interactions
with objects, we expected that attending to the goal location
of an action is relatively easier than attending to the grip of
an action, which should become apparent in faster reaction
times for trials in which subjects attended to the goal loca-
tion compared to the grip of the action. Secondly, because
both the goal- and grip-related aspects are probably
involved in understanding the correctness of an observed
action, an interference eVect of grip-violations was
expected when subjects attended the goal of the action.
Vice versa, goal-violations should interfere when attention
is directed at the grip of the action. However, given the
notion that action goals play a dominant role in the under-
standing of observed actions, a stronger interference eVect
may be expected for goal-violations when judging the cor-
rectness of grips, compared to grip-violations when judging
the correctness of goals.
To investigate the relation between goals and grips in
action observation, we used pictures in which the correct-
ness of the goal location and the grip of the action were
independently manipulated. Fourteen diVerent objects were
chosen that each had a clear goal location associated with
the face and a predeWned speciWc manner of grasping (e.g.
cup, comb, telephone etc., see Table 1). For each object,
four diVerent pictures were taken of an actor using the
object in a (1) correct fashion, (2) applying an incorrect
grip to the object, (3) directing the object to an incorrect
goal, or (4) holding the object with an incorrect grip near an
incorrect goal location (Fig. 1). Correctness of the goal or
grip applied to the object was deWned with respect to the
prototypical action associated with the object. Whereas
objects typically aVord several action possibilities (e.g. a
cup can be used to drink or to catch a Xy), in daily life we
usually associate objects with prototypical grasps and goal
locations (the most frequent action associated with a cup is
“grasping to move towards the mouth”).
Table 1 List of objects used in 
the present experiment
Object
Water bottle
Hair brush
Camera
Telephone
Comb
Cup
Flute
Mouthorgan
Bicycle helmet
Magnifying glass
Microphone
Razor
Spoon
Toothbrush
Fig. 1 Example of diVerent 
stimulus categories used in the 
experiment representing the 
independent manipulation of the 
(in)correctness of the Goal or the 
Grip applied to an object102 Exp Brain Res (2008) 189:99–107
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Experiment 1
In the Wrst experiment subjects were instructed in separate
blocks to decide whether either the goal location or the grip
of the observed action was correct or incorrect. More pre-
cisely, in “attend-to-goal” blocks subjects had to decide
whether the goal location at which the actor held the object,
allowed the functional use of the object (e.g. holding a cup
near the mouth allows drinking, whereas holding a cup near
the eye does not). In “attend-to-grip” blocks, subjects were
explicitly instructed to decide whether the hand-grip
applied to the object was correct or incorrect with respect to
normal object use. Subjects responded by means of a left/
right button press to distinguish between correct and incor-
rect goals and grips. In addition, subjects were instructed to
respond as fast and accurately as possible. Block-order
(“attend-to-goal” vs. “attend-to-grip”) and mapping of
response buttons were counterbalanced between partici-
pants.
Before the experiment started, an object recognition task
was administered to ensure that the subjects recognized all
object stimuli used in the experiment. After careful expla-
nation of the subject’s task, the subjects practiced the task
during 14 practice trials. Practice was repeated in the sec-
ond block. Each block consisted of 112 trials (14 objects £
4 diVerent stimulus categories £ left/right handed actor)
and stimuli were presented in a random order. Pictures
were presented at a resolution of 1,024 £ 768 pixels on a
19 computer monitor, located approximately 60 cm away
from the subject. The picture remained on the screen until a
button-press was detected and between trials a blank screen
was presented for 1 s. For analysis of reaction times, incor-
rect responses and reaction times exceeding the subject’s
mean by more than two standard deviations were excluded
from analysis.
Subjects were students from the Radboud University of
Nijmegen and received course credits or a small experi-
mental fee (4 D) for participation. In the Wrst experiment 16
right-handed subjects were tested (4 males, mean age 21.6
years).
Results
Reaction times and error rates for both “attend-to-goal” and
“attend-to-grip” blocks are represented in Fig. 2. In “attend-
to-goal” blocks subjects made categorization errors in 5.4%
of all trials and in “attend-to-grip” blocks categorization
errors were made in 6.1% of all the trials. Error rates did
not diVer signiWcantly between action blocks (attend to goal
vs. attend to grip), F < 1. The low error rates indicate that
subjects managed quite well to evaluate the correctness of
both the goal and the grip with respect to normal object use.
Reaction times of both blocks were analyzed using a 2
(Block: “attend-to-goal” vs. “attend-to-grip”) £ 2 (Goal:
correct vs. incorrect) £ 2 (Grip: correct vs. incorrect)
repeated measures ANOVA. A main-eVect of Block was
found, reXecting faster reaction times when subjects
attended to the goal of the action (847 ms) compared to
Fig. 2 Reaction times (upper graphs) and error rates (lower graphs)
for Experiment 1. At the left side, graphs represent “attend-to-goal”
blocks, whereas graphs at the right side represent “attend-to-grip”
blocks.  Bars at the left side represent correctness of the relevant
stimulus dimension and bars at the right side represent incorrectness
of the relevant stimulus dimension. Light bars represent correctness of
the irrelevant stimulus dimension and dark bars represent incorrect-
ness of the irrelevant stimulus dimension
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when they attended to the grip of the action (991 ms),
F(1,15) = 40.1, P < 0.001. In addition, a main-eVect of Goal
was found, reXecting faster reaction times to observation of
correct (878 ms) compared to incorrect goals (959 ms),
F(1,15) = 58.3, P < 0.001. A main-eVect of Grip reXects
faster responses to correct (906 ms) compared to incorrect
grips (931 ms), F(1,15) = 4.8, P < 0.05. Furthermore, an
interaction-eVect between Goal and Grip was found,
reXecting that the interference-eVect of incorrect goals
diVered between observation of correct grips (interference-
eVect = 142 ms) and incorrect grips (interference-eVect =
20 ms), F(1,15) = 61.4, P < 0.001. Finally, an interaction-
eVect was found between Block and Goal, reXecting a
stronger interference-eVect of goal-violations when sub-
jects attended to the Grip (diVerence between correct and
incorrect goals = 113 ms) than when they attended to the
Goal of the action (diVerence between correct and incorrect
goals = 30 ms), F(1,15) = 10.3, P < 0.01. To further investi-
gate the interference-eVects of goal- and grip-violations in
“attend-to-goal” and “attend-to-grip” blocks, reaction times
were analyzed for separate blocks, using a 2 (Goal: correct
vs. incorrect) £ 2 (Grip: correct vs. incorrect) repeated
measures ANOVA.
Reaction times obtained during blocks in which subjects
attended to the goal of the action are represented in the left
upper graph in Fig. 2 and were analyzed using a 2 (Goal:
correct vs. incorrect) £ 2 (Grip: correct vs. incorrect)
repeated measures ANOVA. Analysis of “attend-to-goal”
blocks revealed a main-eVect of Goal, F(1,15) = 12.2, P <
0.005 and a main-eVect of Grip F(1,15) = 12.1, P < 0.005.
Interestingly, a signiWcant interaction-eVect was found
between Grip and Goal, F(1,15) = 20.5, P < 0.001. The
interaction eVect between Goals and Grips was further
investigated, using post hoc T tests, with Bonferroni correc-
tion for multiple comparisons lowering signiWcance crite-
rion  to 0.013. A signiWcant diVerence between correct and
incorrect grips was found only when the goal of the action
was correct, t(15) = 5.7, P < 0.001 (left side of upper left
graph; eVect-size grip = 77 ms). When the goal of the
action was incorrect, no additional eVect of grip-violations
was observed, t(15) = 1.5, P = 0.22 (right side of upper left
graph).
Analysis of the error rates for “attend-to-goal” blocks
revealed signiWcant diVerences between pictures represent-
ing objects at a correct goal with an incorrect grip and all
other stimulus categories (P’s < 0.001) indicating, that sub-
jects made most errors (3.3% of all trials) when the Grip of
the action was incorrect and the Goal was correct (Fig. 2,
lower left graph, second bar).
Reaction times for blocks when subjects attended to the
grip of the action are represented in the right upper graph of
Fig. 2 and were analyzed using a 2 (Goal: correct vs. incor-
rect) £ 2 (Grip: correct vs. incorrect) repeated measures
ANOVA. Analysis of “attend-to-grip” blocks revealed a
main eVect of Goal, F(1,15) = 55.9, P < 0.001. No main
eVect of Grip was found, F(1,15) = 1.0, P > 0.33. A signiW-
cant interaction was found between Goal and Grip, F(1,15)
= 35.8, P < 0.001. The interaction-eVect between Goal and
Grip was further investigated using post hoc T tests, with
Bonferroni correction lowering signiWcance criterion  to
0.013. A signiWcant diVerence between correct and incor-
rect goals was found, only when the grip of the action was
correct, t(15) = 10.8, P < 0.001 (Fig. 2, upper right graph,
1st and 2nd bar). When the grip of the action was incorrect,
no additional interference of goal-violations was observed,
t(15) = 1.8, P > 0.1 (Fig. 2, upper right graph, 3rd and 4th
bar). Thus, when subjects attended to the grip of an action,
a strong interference of goal-violations was observed only
when the grip was correct (eVect-size of Goal: 188 ms).
Investigation of the error rates revealed that subjects made
most errors (3.3% of all trials) when only the Goal of the
action was incorrect and the Grip was correct (P’s < 0.001;
Fig. 2, lower right graph, second bar).
Discussion
In line with our prediction, we found that attending to the
grip of an action requires more elaborate processing than
attending to the goal location of the action, as reXected in
slower reaction times for trials in which the subject judged
the correctness of the grip. Importantly, analysis of reaction
times revealed a consistent eVect of goal- and grip-related
violations on making decisions about the correctness of
either the goal or the grip of the action. A strong interfer-
ence with subjects’ decisions about the correctness of the
goal location of an action was observed only when the grip
applied to the object was incorrect. When the goal location
of the action was incorrect, no additional interference of the
irrelevant stimulus dimension was observed. Vice versa,
when subjects decided on the correctness of the grip of the
action, a strong interference was found only when the
action was directed at an incorrect goal. When the grip
applied to the object was incorrect, no additional interfer-
ence of irrelevant goal-violations was observed. As
expected, goal-violations had a stronger interference-eVect
on reaction times (eVect-size = 188 ms) than grip-violations
(eVect-size = 77 ms).
Analyses of error rates showed that subjects made most
errors only when the irrelevant stimulus dimension was
incorrect. That is, when subjects attended to the goal of an
action, most errors were made when the grip was incorrect,
whereas when subjects attended the grip of the action, most
errors were made when the goal location was incorrect,
thereby supporting reaction time Wndings.
The present Wndings are in line with our prediction that
action goals play a dominant role in understanding the104 Exp Brain Res (2008) 189:99–107
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correctness of observed actions. In addition, the interfer-
ence eVect of grip-violations suggests that the (in)correct-
ness of the hand grip applied to an object interferes with
making decisions about the correctness of the action goal.
Thereby, these Wndings suggest that processing the goal and
grip of an observed action are complementary processes
that enable us to make sense of what another person is
doing.
In the Wrst experiment, the interference-eVect of goal- or
grip-related violations was shown to be dependent on task
instruction (“attend to goal” vs. “attend to grip”). Appar-
ently, the interference-eVects of goal- and grip-related vio-
lations are dependent on the activation of speciWc semantic
knowledge about objects. However, it might be argued that
reaction time eVects actually reXect diVerences between
stimulus categories at a perceptual level. Both when sub-
jects attended to the goal and grip of the action a facilitation
of responses was found for pictures representing objects
being used in a correct fashion (correct goal and correct
grip). To rule out the possibility that perceptual diVerences
between diVerent stimulus categories contributed to reac-
tion time eVects, a second experiment was conducted, in
which subjects categorized pictures on the basis of action-
unrelated features. If attention is directed at stimulus fea-
tures that are unrelated to the action, the interaction-eVect
between Goal and Grip should disappear (e.g. no facilita-
tion for pictures representing correct object use). If, how-
ever, the eVects found in Experiment 1 are due to a
diVerence at a perceptual level the eVect should also remain
in a non-conceptual knowledge based task.
Experiment 2
The same picture stimuli were used as in the Wrst experi-
ment. Subjects were instructed to make a subjective judg-
ment about the orientation of the object in the picture. For
example, if they considered the object to be oriented in a
more horizontal fashion, they were required to push the left
button and to push the right button if they considered the
object to be oriented in a more vertical position. Assign-
ment of response-buttons to horizontal or vertical judg-
ments was counterbalanced between participants. Subjects
performed one block of 114 trials. Sixteen subjects (1 male,
mean age: 21.9 years) participated in the second experiment
and received course credits or 4 D for participation.
Results
On average, subjects classiWed 59.7% of the objects in all
pictures as being oriented horizontally and 40.3% as being
oriented in a vertical fashion. To classify subjects’ categori-
zation responses as correct or incorrect, two diVerent analy-
ses were conducted.
In a Wrst analysis the consistency of the categorization
per picture was assessed, by calculating a consistency ratio.
The absolute diVerence between responses classifying the
orientation of the object as horizontal or vertical per picture
was divided by the total number of responses, resulting in a
value between 0 (no consistency; equal number of horizon-
tal and vertical classiWcations) and 1 (full consistency). Pic-
tures that had a consistency lower than 0.8 were considered
to be ambiguous. In this way, 12 pictures were classiWed as
ambiguous and excluded from reaction time analysis (9.4%
of all stimuli). Reaction times were analyzed, using a 2
(Goal: correct vs. incorrect) £ 2 (Grip: correct vs. incor-
rect) repeated measures ANOVA. Analysis of reaction
times revealed a main eVect of Goal, F(1,15) = 7.2, P <
0.05, reXecting slower responses to pictures in which an
object was directed at an incorrect goal compared to a cor-
rect goal (eVect-size Goal = 24 ms). Importantly and in
contrast to the Wrst experiment, no signiWcant interaction
between Goal and Grip was observed, F < 1.
Because each individual picture was presented twice to
each subject, in a second analysis it was determined
whether individual subjects were consistent in their catego-
rization of speciWc pictures (the same picture should always
be classiWed as being horizontal or vertical). According to
this criterion, subjects made inconsistent categorization
responses in 6.9% of all the trials. After exclusion of
ambiguous responses, analysis of reaction times revealed
only a marginally signiWcant main eVect of Goal, F(1,15) =
3.5, P = 0.08, indicating a trend towards slower responses
to pictures representing objects at incorrect compared to
correct goals (eVect-size Goal = 26 ms; Fig. 3). Again, no
interaction was found between Goal and Grip. Analyses of
error rates are represented in the lower part of Fig. 3 and
revealed a signiWcant main eVect of Grip, F(1,15) = 6.4, P <
0.05, indicating that subjects were more uncertain in cate-
gorization of the orientation of the object when the grip
applied to the object was incorrect.
Discussion
In the second experiment subjects observed the same pic-
tures as in Experiment 1, in which the correctness of the
goal location and the grip applied to an object were inde-
pendently manipulated. Rather than attending to action-
related features (categorization of the correctness of either
the goal or the grip of the action), in the second experiment
subjects were required to categorize the object as being ori-
ented in a more horizontal or vertical fashion. Whereas in
the Wrst experiment a highly signiWcant interaction between
Goal and Grip was found, no interaction-eVect was found inExp Brain Res (2008) 189:99–107 105
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the second experiment. Only a trend was observed for
slower responses to pictures in which the object was pre-
sented at an incorrect goal location. Thus, reaction time
data diVer in important respects from the interference
eVects of goal- and grip-related violations that were
observed in Experiment 1. Thereby, Wndings from Experi-
ment 2 rule out the possibility that interference eVects of
goal- or grip-violations could be explained on the basis of
perceptual diVerences between stimulus categories alone.
Only when subjects focused on action-related aspects (cor-
rectness of goal or grip), observation of goal- or grip-
related violations interfered with the categorization
response.
General discussion
The present study aimed at the question how people under-
stand the (in)correctness of an observed action and how
semantic knowledge about goal- and grip-related aspects of
object use is involved. On the basis of the dominance of
action goals in the planning of our own actions, we
expected that action goals should play an important role in
the understanding of observed actions as well. To separate
the relative contribution of goal- and grip-related features
of action understanding, in the Wrst experiment we asked
subjects to selectively attend to the correctness of either the
goal or the grip of an observed action. At least two Wndings
support our hypothesis that action goals play a dominant
role in action understanding.
First, reaction times were signiWcantly slower when sub-
jects attended to the grip of the action, compared to when
they attended to the goal of the action. Apparently, goal-
related information is more easily activated, which might
be due to the fact that it can be deWned more directly in spa-
tial terms (i.e. end location). Secondly, it was found that
goal-violations caused a stronger interference with catego-
rization responses than grip-violations. Both the faster reac-
tion times when subjects attended to the goal compared to
the grip of the action and the stronger interference-eVects of
goal-violations than grip-violations are in line with our pre-
diction that action semantic knowledge used in action
understanding is organized primarily around goals.
Importantly, the distinction between goal- and grip-
related aspects of actions can be described at diVerent lev-
els within the hierarchy of action representation (Grafton
and Hamilton 2007). Thus, at a semantic level, the present
study suggests that goal-related information is more easily
activated than grip-related information. At a perceptual
level it could well be that the advantage of processing goals
relative to grips is reXected in an advantage of global over
local visual processing (Antes and Mann 1984). More pre-
cisely, the functional mechanism by which subjects attend
either to goal- or grip-related aspects of an observed action
might be described in terms of attending to global or local
features of the picture.
In an additional analysis we investigated whether global-
over-local precedence might be a valid way to characterize
the advantage of goals over grips at a perceptual level. To
this end, we split up the stimuli in two diVerent categories,
according to whether the object was grasped with a full grip
(whole-hand grip) or with a precision grip (Wne grip
between index Wnger and thumb). If attending to the goal of
an action relies on global visual processing, it might be rel-
atively easier to process full grips compared to precision
grips. Interestingly, when subjects attended to the goal of
the action, an advantage of processing full grips compared
to small grips was found, as reXected in faster reaction
times and lower error rates for observation of full grips
(Supplementary Results and Supplementary Fig. 1 in Elec-
tronic supplementary material). In contrast, when subjects
attended to the grip of the action, no advantage of full grips
over precision grips was found. These Wndings suggest that
processing goal-related semantic information is reXected at
a perceptual level in global visual processing, whereas
Fig. 3 Reaction times (upper graph) and error rates (lower graph) for
Experiment 2 in which subjects attended to the orientation of the ob-
ject. Bars at the left side represent stimuli in which the goal-location
was correct and bars at the right side represent incorrect action goals.
Light bars represent stimuli in which the grip was correct, whereas
dark bars represent stimuli in which the grip was incorrect
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processing grip-related information increases sensitivity to
local visual features. Thereby, the present Wndings support
the view that the supposed hierarchy underlying the obser-
vation of actions can be described at multiple levels of
complexity (Grafton and Hamilton 2007).
However, it is important to note that the global-over-
local precedence at a perceptual level cannot account for
the interaction eVects between goals and grips found at the
semantic level in the present study. In visual attention para-
digms, interference eVects of the irrelevant stimulus dimen-
sion have only been reported for global aspects (e.g.
Navon, 1977). Irrelevant local information typically does
not interfere with making global judgments. In contrast, in
the present study, interference eVects were found both for
task-irrelevant goal- and grip-related violations, suggesting
that interference eVects cannot be explained at a purely per-
ceptual level.
In the present study, correctness of the goal or grip of an
observed action was independently manipulated. However,
in action execution the correctness of the grip is often spec-
iWed in relation to the end goal (e.g. grasping a knife at the
blade is clearly incorrect in case one wants to butter bread,
but not if one wants to put the knife in the dishwasher).
Accordingly, faster reaction times for evaluation of goals
compared to grips might actually reXect that evaluation of
grips involves an evaluation of the correctness of the action
goal as well. If evaluation of grips would require evaluation
of goal information as well, a strong interference should be
expected for incorrect goals, independently of the correct-
ness of the grip. Instead, goal- or grip-related violations
caused an interference-eVect only when the task-relevant
stimulus dimension was correct. For example, when sub-
jects attended to the grip of the action, an interference-eVect
of goal-violations was found only when the grip of the
action was correct. When the relevant stimulus dimension
was incorrect, no additional interference eVect of the irrele-
vant dimension was found. This suggests that action knowl-
edge about the correct use of an object is only retrieved
when the attended action feature (e.g. grip) is consistent
with the stored action knowledge about an object (e.g. pre-
cision grip). In case the attended action property is incon-
sistent or incorrect with stored action knowledge (e.g. using
a spoon with a full grip), additional retrieval of the irrele-
vant action feature is inhibited or obstructed.
The selective interference of irrelevant stimulus proper-
ties found in the present study is in line with Wndings from a
recent study by Bach et al. (2005) in which subjects were
required to selectively attend to either the spatial or the
functional match between a tool and a target object. It was
found that irrelevant spatial mismatches (e.g. object with
wrong orientation) only aVected the judgment of functional
matches (e.g. key near a doorlock) but no interference was
found for categorization of functional mismatches (e.g.
screwdriver near a doorlock; Bach et al. 2005; Experiment
2A and 2B). Based on these Wndings Bach et al. argue that
irrelevant spatial information can either facilitate or inhibit
an action representation that is already activated on the
basis of functional information. In case of a functional mis-
match no action representation is available and therefore no
additional interference eVect is observed for the irrelevant
spatial mismatch.
This interpretation Wts nicely with data from the present
study, suggesting that subjects rely on the activation of
semantic representations when required to attend to goals
or grips. For example, when subjects judge the correctness
of the goal and the observed goal is correct, the activated
semantic representation can either be facilitated or inhibited
by the concomitant observation of grip-related information.
In contrast, when the goal of the observed action is incor-
rect, no semantic representation is available and therefore
no additional interference by the irrelevant stimulus dimen-
sion is observed. Interestingly, present Wndings show inter-
ference eVects of the irrelevant stimulus dimension both for
categorizing the correctness of goals and grips. Apparently,
semantic representations are activated when attention is
directed at either goal- or grip-related aspects of object use,
indicating that both goals and grips are part of our semantic
knowledge about objects. Whereas Bach et al. (2005)
assessed the spatial and functional relation between two
objects, the present study further extends these Wndings by
showing how knowledge about both goals and grips is
involved in understanding the correctness of an observed
action.
Further support for the selective processing of task-rele-
vant features was obtained in the second experiment, in
which subjects attended to an action-unrelated stimulus fea-
ture (i.e. orientation of object). No reaction time interfer-
ence eVects of goal- or grip-violations were observed for
categorization of object orientation, suggesting that seman-
tic knowledge about objects is selectively activated, only
when subjects had to think about action-related features.
More precisely, when subjects focused on the correctness
of the goal or the grip of the observed action, their
responses were facilitated by observation of an object being
used in a correct fashion and inhibited by the observation of
incorrect object use. When subjects categorized the orienta-
tion of the object, no action semantic knowledge needed to
be activated, as reXected in the absence of an interaction
between goals and grips. Thereby, we could rule out the
alternative explanation that reaction time eVects could be
explained by perceptual diVerences between stimuli.
Based on the neuropsychological dissociation between
knowing what to do with an object (goal) and knowing how
to grasp an object (Ochipa et al. 1989) and on previous
Wndings suggesting that immediate and distal action goals
are mediated by distinct neural systems (Majdandzic et al.Exp Brain Res (2008) 189:99–107 107
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2007; van Schie and Bekkering 2007) it is suggested that
distinct but complementary brain areas support goal- and
grip-related aspects of action planning. In the present study
we investigated whether a similar functional relation
between goal- and grip-related features applies to the obser-
vation of object directed actions as well. Our data suggest
that whereas attention can be selectively directed to either
the goal or the grip of an observed action, both goal and
grip-related features are to some extent automatically pro-
cessed. Recent fMRI data suggest that observation of
unusual goals is associated with activation in the inferior
frontal gyrus, which is considered part of the human mirror
system (de Lange et al. 2008; however for diVerent view,
see: Turella et al. 2007). In contrast, observation of unusual
grips resulted in higher activation in the lateral occipito-
temporal complex around the extrastriate body area, proba-
bly reXecting the processing of body postures in an action
context. Thereby, these data suggest specialized networks
for processing goal- or grip-related aspects of observed
actions.
Taken together, the present Wndings suggest that our
knowledge about the use of objects is organized primarily
around typically associated goal locations. In addition, our
data support a close interaction between the processes sup-
porting goal- and grip-related aspects of an action.
Although the neural mechanisms supporting the selective
processing of goal- or grip-related aspects call for further
investigation, the present study suggests at a behavioral
level a possible hierarchical organization of the semantic
knowledge used in understanding the correctness of others’
actions.
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tive Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Antes JR, Mann SW (1984) Global-local precedence in picture pro-
cessing. Psychol Res 46:247–259
Bach P, Knoblich G, Gunter TC, Friederici AD, Prinz W (2005) Action
comprehension: deriving spatial and functional relations. J Exp
Psychol Hum Percept Perform 31:465–479
Buxbaum LJ (2001) Ideomotor apraxia: a call to action. Neurocase
7:445–458
de Lange FP, Spronk M, Willems RM, Toni I, Bekkering H (2008)
Complementary systems for understanding action intentions.
Curr Biol 18:454–457
Ferrari PF, Rozzi S, Fogassi L (2005) Mirror neurons responding to
observation of actions made with tools in monkey ventral premo-
tor cortex. J Cogn Neurosci 17:212–226
Gallese V, Fadiga L, Fogassi L, Rizzolatti G (1996) Action recognition
in the premotor cortex. Brain 119(Pt 2):593–609
Grafton ST, Hamilton AF (2007) Evidence for a distributed hierarchy
of action representation in the brain. Hum Mov Sci 26:590–616
Lindemann O, Stenneken P, van Schie HT, Bekkering H (2006)
Semantic activation in action planning. J Exp Psychol Hum Per-
cept Perform 32:633–643
Majdandzic J, Grol MJ, van Schie HT, Verhagen L, Toni I, Bekkering
H (2007) The role of immediate and Wnal goals in action planning:
an fMRI study. Neuroimage 37:589–598
Navon D (1977) Forest before trees: the precedence of global features
in visual perception. Cogn Psychol 9:353–383
Ochipa C, Rothi LJ, Heilman KM (1989) Ideational apraxia: a deWcit
in tool selection and use. Ann Neurol 25:190–193
Rizzolatti G, Craighero L (2004) The mirror-neuron system. Annu Rev
Neurosci 27:169–192
Rizzolatti G, Fadiga L, Gallese V, Fogassi L (1996) Premotor cortex
and the recognition of motor actions. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res
3:131–141
Rosenbaum DA, Vaughan J, Barnes HJ, Jorgensen MJ (1992) Time
course of movement planning: selection of handgrips for object
manipulation. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 18:1058–1073
Turella L, Pierno AC, Tubaldi F, Castiello U (2007) Mirror neurons in
humans: Consisting or confounding evidence? Brain Lang (in
press)
Umilta MA, Kohler E, Gallese V, Fogassi L, Fadiga L, Keysers C, Riz-
zolatti G (2001) I know what you are doing: a neurophysiological
study. Neuron 31:155–165
Van Elk M, Van Schie HT, Bekkering H (2008) Semantics in action:
an electrophysiological study on the use of semantic knowledge
for action. J Physiol, Paris (in press)
Van Elk M, Van Schie HT, Lindemann O, Bekkering H (2007) Using
conceptual knowledge in action and language. In: Haggard P,
Rossetti Y, Kawato M (eds) Attention and performance XXII:
sensorimotor foundations of higher cognition. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, pp 575–599
van Schie HT, Bekkering H (2007) Neural mechanisms underlying
immediate and Wnal action goals in object use reXected by slow
wave brain potentials. Brain Res 1148:183–197